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Home wireless networks are diﬃcult to manage and comprehend because of evolving
locality, co-locality, connectivity and interaction. We deﬁne formal models of home wireless
network infrastructure and policies and investigate how they can be used in a network
management system designed to provide user-oriented support. We model spatial and
temporal behaviour of network interactions and user-initiated network policies and deﬁne
an online framework for generation of models from network and user-initiated events. The
models are expressed in an extension to Milner’s bigraphical reactive systems. Analysis of
the models is carried out in real-time by a bespoke bigraph reasoning system based on
checking predicates, which is encoded as bigraph matching. Real-time model generation
and analysis is implemented on the experimental Homework system router and trialled
with synthetic and actual network data.
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
1. Introduction
Wireless home networking is notoriously diﬃcult to install and manage, especially for non-expert users. The Homework
network management system [1] is an experimental system designed to provide user-oriented support in home wireless
local area network (WLAN) environments. The Homework system is much more than a user interface for existing network
infrastructure. It provides new network architectures that take into account the sociotechnical nature of home networking.
For example, devices are brought into the home by family and friends, and users deﬁne policies for explicit management and
access. It also encompasses new approaches to infrastructure measurement and monitoring and user focused computational
models for modelling and analysis in support of both design and user experience. In particular, the Homework system is
a platform from which we can investigate how formal models can be used iteratively and interactively to contribute to
the question “is the proposed network infrastructure ﬁt for purpose”, and more generally, if and how seamfully exposing
models of infrastructure and user behaviour to those being modelled is useful and can be carried out in real-time, without
interruption or delay to the network management system.
The aim of this paper is to deﬁne suitable formal models of the infrastructure and policies and to investigate how they
can be used in an extension to the basic Homework network management system.
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1.1. The standard Homework system
The Homework system architecture consists of three complementary planes: data, signalling, and information. We focus
on the last, which is a monitoring application that makes available information about network set-up, management and
measurement. It uses a stream database to record (raw and derived) events. Events include network behaviours such as
detecting that a new machine has joined the network, resulting in new links and granting a DHCP lease, and user-initiated
behaviours such as enforcing or dropping a policy. Policies are deﬁned by users through a novel user interface that allows
drag and drop, comic-strip style interaction (see [2]). Typically, policies forbid or allow access to network resources; for
example, a policy might block UDP and TCP traﬃc from a given website, or restrict Internet access for certain users during
given time periods.
1.2. Modelling wireless network management
Locality, co-location, interaction, connectivity, and user-perceived events are key aspects of user-oriented home network-
ing. We require models that expose these aspects, and their temporal evolution, to both end users and system developers,
and permit computation and analysis of properties in real-time. While various formalisms might ﬁt these criteria to a greater
or lesser extent, we propose that bigraphs with sharing, an extension of Milner’s universal process algebra that encapsu-
lates both dynamic and spatial behaviour [3], ﬁt all these criteria particularly well. Speciﬁcally, bigraphical reactive systems
(BRS) are well suited to the problem because a) the (human-oriented) graphical form provides an intuitive representation
of locality, co-locality, and connectivity, b) there is an explicit representation of user-perceived events by rewrite rules and
c) there is a (machine readable) algebraic form for computation and veriﬁcation of properties.
In our models, each BRS consists of a set of bigraphs that describes spatial and communication relationships between
machines and entities in the network, and a set of bigraphical reaction rules that deﬁne how the bigraphs can evolve over
time. We have extended the basic formalism of BRS to bigraphical reactive systems with sharing, to permit effective and
intuitive representation of spatial locations that can overlap.1 This extension is particularly relevant to our requirements,
since multiple, overlapping signals are fundamental to wireless networks.
1.3. Real-time model generation, analysis and feedback in Homework
In our extension to the Homework system, models are generated from events recorded in the information plane and
analysed without interruption or delay to the network management system.
The system is depicted in Fig. 1. As we have indicated above, the Stream database is part of the standard Homework
management system; all network and policy events are recorded as streams of tuples in the database. The Bigraph encoder
component is new, and it encodes events as bigraphical reaction rules. The Bigraph analysis component is also new, and
it has two roles. First, it generates the bigraphical representation of the current conﬁguration of the WLAN, according to
the sequences of reaction rules received from the Bigraph encoder. Second, it analyses the current conﬁguration by checking
properties, for example, whether or not a conﬁguration violates a user-invoked access control policy. Properties are ex-
pressed as predicates that are encoded as instances of bigraph matching. The results are logged and can be fed back to the
system, or to the user, using the graphical notation of bigraphs as explanation. This work ﬂow is carried out in real-time,
hence we refer to our approach as real-time veriﬁcation.
While our long-term motivation is to aid users in their understanding of the state of their system (e.g. when and why
it is “broken”), and to give feedback to developers about user experiences, in this paper we concentrate on the technical
details of the representations of networks and policies and the analysis system itself.
1 Henceforth we refer to this extension simply as BRS.
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The main focus of this paper is to describe the bigraphical representations of networks topologies, the events that modify
topologies and the access control policies, and how to represent and check predicates on bigraphs within the runtime
system.
The contributions of the paper are the following:
• representations of network topologies as bigraphs and network events (such as a machine leaving and joining a net-
work) as bigraphical reaction rules,
• representations of access control policies that forbid and allow behaviours as bigraphical reaction rules that constrain
network evolutions,
• new reasoning techniques for predicates over bigraphs, encoded as instances of bigraph matching and implemented
using a SAT solver,
• a solution for the problem of how to check for the non-existence of patterns in bigraphical reaction rules, and how to
reason about topologies with arbitrary numbers of machines and communication channels, by tagging and untagging
entities,
• online generation of bigraphical reactive system models from the current network topology and activated policies, as
recorded in the Homework information plane, and
• empirical evidence demonstrating that generation and analysis of bigraph models can be carried out in real-time within
the Homework system.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 contains an informal introduction to the bigraph notation, bigraphical re-
active systems and bigraph matching. In Section 3 we describe how network topologies are represented as bigraphical
systems and how network events, such as moving in and out of the router’s range, and granting and revoking of leases,
are encoded as reaction rules; in Section 4 we show how predicates are encoded as bigraphs, and thus can be checked by
bigraph matching. In Section 5 the rules and predicates deﬁned in Section 3 are used to generate sequences of models in
real-time. Section 6 describes how policies that forbid and allow behaviour are represented as bigraphical reaction rules and
how they constrain network evolutions. In Section 7 we describe how policy events such as enforce a policy, drop a policy
or check a policy, are encoded as reaction rules, and we discuss the interplay between the (representations of) network and
policy events. In Section 8 we show in detail how a bigraphical model of a WLAN is updated according to the stream of
network and policy events generated in real-time. Section 9 discusses the role of state predicates in the analysis of network
conﬁgurations and compliance with policies; in Section 10, we give an overview of the implementation. A discussion of the
overall approach and the role of the bigraph abstraction is in Section 11 and related work is reviewed in Section 12; we
conclude in Section 13.
2. Bigraphs with sharing
In this section we give an informal overview of BRS, with some examples. The overview contains suﬃcient detail for this
paper; a concise semantics of bigraphs with sharing is deﬁned in [4]. Details of standard BRS (without sharing) are in [3].
A bigraph has a graphical and an algebraic form. In this paper, we use both forms, but primarily the graphical form. In
the graphical form, an entity (real or virtual) is encoded by a node (oval or circle). Spatial placement of nodes is described
by node nesting, which we have extended to directed acyclic graphs. Thus, nodes can be placed in the intersection of other
nodes. Each node is assigned a control. Interaction between nodes is represented by an edge called a link that connects
ports. Each node can have zero, one or many ports, indicated by bullets. They can be thought of as sockets into which links
can be plugged. A dashed rectangle denotes a region of adjacent parts of the system. A grey square indicates a site, which
encodes part of the model that has been abstracted away. A link may be only partially speciﬁed, in which case it connects
ports with a name. Name closure /x A is used to disallow connections on name x in bigraph A.
As an example, consider the WLAN depicted in Fig. 2: there is one machine and a router in the network, each associated
with a signal.
This network is represented as a bigraph in Fig. 3. There are three controls M1, S, and R; the two signals (of the machine
and the router) are represented by the nodes of control S, the router is indicated by the node of control R and the machine
is represented by the node of control M1. There are three links: a link between machine M1 and its signal, a link between
router R and its signal, and a link between machine M1 and router R. There are no names in this bigraph.
The capabilities of a bigraph to interact with the external environment are given in its interface. For example, we write
A : 1 → 〈2, {x, y}〉 to indicate that A has one site, two regions and the names x and y. Controls and links in a bigraph are
classiﬁed by means of sorts (ranged over by a, b, . . . ) and a formation rule deﬁnes sorting properties a bigraph has to satisfy.
For example, in a WLAN representation, a typical formation rule would be: an R node is always contained in an S node (i.e.
a router has a signal). A sort may be a disjunction, which we denote as follows: âb means that a node can have sort a or b.
The interface of a sorted bigraph is expressed as follows: A : a → 〈bb, {x, y}〉. The notation indicates that the site has sort a
and the two regions have sort b.
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Fig. 3. Bigraph representation of simple WLAN with one machine and a router.
The structure of a bigraph can also be speciﬁed in algebraic form by combining elementary bigraphs and bigraphical
operations. A summary is given in Table 1. Except for sharing, the notation is fairly straightforward. An explanation of the
notation for sharing is the following. Sharing is a specialised version of nesting: share F by φ in G denotes the bigraph in
which the regions of bigraph F can be placed inside the sites of bigraph G . The association between F ’s regions and G ’s
sites is speciﬁed by placing φ, which is a bigraph without nodes. This allows the expression of shared nodes, i.e. nodes
situated in the intersection of other nodes. Numbering of regions and sites proceeds from left to right starting from zero.
Therefore, placings can be expressed by a vector of sets indicating unambiguously how regions are shared by sites. For
example,
share F by φ in G
where F
def= A ‖ B, G def= C | D and placing φ def= [{0}, {0,1}], is depicted in Fig. 4. This Figure also indicates the difference
between the more familiar Venn diagram graphical notation that we use, and the usual stratiﬁed notation. Here, φ has
length 2 and indicates that the ﬁrst F region (the region containing the A-node) is placed in the ﬁrst G site (the site in the
C-node) while the second F region (the region containing the B-node) is shared between the ﬁrst and the second of G ’s site
(the sites in the C and D-nodes, respectively). Regarding elementary bigraphs, 1 denotes an empty region and 0 expresses
a site that is not within a region; the latter only exists because of sharing. Identities are indicated with idn,X where n ∈ N
and X is the elements of a set of names. We sometimes write idn when X = ∅ and id for id1.
We note that while it is possible to encode sharing in standard BRS, these encodings suffer several disadvantages (see [4]
for details); moreover, an advantage of explicit sharing is that it overcomes the asymmetric treatment of roots and sites in
standard bigraphs.
Evolution in a BRS is deﬁned by rewrite rules, called bigraph reaction rules, which induce a transition relation on bigraphs.
Reaction rules are written with an arrow thus: , whereas transitions between bigraphs are written with an arrow thus:
. We also use ∗ to indicate zero or more transitions. As an example, consider the evolution of a WLAN consisting
of two machines and a router, to one machine and a router, as depicted in Fig. 5a. On the left-hand side, the two machines
are part of the network. They can both sense the router, but not each other. On the right-hand side, one machine has left
the network. This evolution can be represented formally with two bigraphs, W0 and W1, as shown in Fig. 5b. Note that
on the left-hand side, each signal is linked to its device and the three devices are linked together to indicate they all are
part of the WLAN. On the right-hand side, M2 and its signal disappear. The link representing the WLAN now only connects
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Elementary bigraphs and operations on bigraphs.
Fig. 4. Two representations of bigraphical term share F by φ in G , where F
def= A ‖ B and G def= C | D. Graphical notation using Venn diagrams (left) and
stratiﬁed notation highlighting placing φ
def= [{0}, {0,1}] (right).
M1 and R. Observe that both bigraphs W0 and W1 respect the formation rule described above (i.e. an R node is always
contained in an S node).
Now consider how the transformation of W0 into W1 is speciﬁed by the reaction rule given in Fig. 6. In general, the
left-hand side of a reaction rule identiﬁes the parts of a bigraph that are to be modiﬁed (this is also called bigraphmatching),
and the right-hand side describes how to modify them. In this example, bigraph R identiﬁes M2 and its signal as the
sub-parts of W0 that are to be modiﬁed. The site indicates that other nodes can be present inside the S node. Similarly,
name r represents the fact that M2 can be linked to other nodes. When the reaction rule is applied to W0, the site is
associated to R and r to M1. The two regions surrounding node M2, together with the site inside S, are necessary to express
that the site and M2 are in different parts of the system. This is shown in W0, where M2 and R are in different intersections
of S nodes. Right-hand side R ′ speciﬁes that the sub-parts of W0 matched by R are substituted by two regions, a site
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Fig. 6. Reaction rule R R ′: machine M2 leaves the WLAN.
and a closed link on name r, i.e. M2 and its signal are removed. When the occurrence of R in W0 is replaced with R ′ ,
we indeed obtain the updated WLAN encoded by bigraph W1. Note that this rule highlights a diﬃculty of simple Venn
diagrams for representing complex spatial relationships. For example, on the right-hand side the grey site is not within the
parent region of S (i.e. the upper right-hand region) because this would impose a relationship between the grey site and
this region. While there was a relationship between this site and signal S on the left-hand side of the rule, when S is no
longer present, there is no relationship.
2.1. Bigraph matching and rewriting
Like in any rule-based system, a given reaction rule is applicable to a given bigraph (the target) when the left-hand side
of the reaction rule (the pattern) matches the target. Thus bigraph matching is fundamental to the transition relation .
Bigraph matching was ﬁrst deﬁned in [5] by a set of inference rules characterising the occurrence of an abstract pattern in
an abstract target. However, these rules do not lead to an eﬃcient implementation, nor can they be extended in an eﬃcient
way to bigraphs with sharing. In particular, there is only one way to extend the rules to deal with sharing and it increases
signiﬁcantly the amount of unnecessary blind search into the inference process. Whereas the matching problem without
sharing is (in general) an instance of the subforest isomorphism problem, in most cases (for example, when a reaction
rule is applied) it is an instance of the subtree isomorphism problem, which can be eﬃciently solved in polynomial time.
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Controls and sorts for WLAN.
Control Meaning Sort Graphical notation
R Router r Circle
S Wireless signal s Oval
M Wi-Fi enabled machine m Circle
Internet Outside world j Box
Properties, . . . Conﬁguration settings b Box
W WLAN w Circle
I, . . . Input i Small rectangle
O, . . . Output o Small arrowhead
MAC, . . . MAC address p Rounded box
Hostname, . . . Hostname p Rounded box
IP, . . . IP address p Rounded box
However, the matching problem for bigraphs with sharing is a special case of the subgraph isomorphism problem, which
is NP-complete. We have deﬁned and implemented an eﬃcient algorithm for matching bigraphs with sharing based on a
SAT-encoding, which has proven effective for solving several other NP-complete problems (e.g. graph colouring problem,
bounded model checking). Since (standard) bigraphs are a special case of bigraphs with sharing, our algorithm works for
standard bigraphs as well. Full details of the algorithm are given in [4]. Details of experiments with synthetic and actual
network data are given in Section 10, where we note the slowest update (including checking several predicates) is less than
0.1 s.
A rewriting paradigm we encounter several times when modelling home wireless network management is the need to
apply a rewrite rule(s) a ﬁxed number of times to certain terms in the representation. For example, we may require to
apply a reaction rule to (the representation of) every machine in the network. But, we are dealing with a dynamic network
topology, and we do not have a ﬁxed number of machines. Alternatively, we may need to distinguish between machines
that are connected to the network and those that are not, so that we can apply a treatment to only one type. Our solution
is to “tag” terms that have been treated (or conversely, have still to be treated). This means adding additional reaction rules
to apply and remove the markings, a process we refer to as “tagging” and “untagging”. The ﬁrst occurrence of this paradigm
is in Section 3.4 where we consider granting leases to machines in the network.
3. Bigraphical models of network topology and network events
In this section we outline how a given network topology is represented by a bigraph, and then how network events,
such as moving in/out of the router’s range and granting/revoking leases, are represented by reaction rules.
3.1. Network topology
We use a node to represent each entity present in the network, which can be physical e.g. router, wireless signal,
machines, or virtual e.g. conﬁguration properties, the Internet, communication channels. Links connect related entities. For
instance, a machine is linked to its signal and to its properties. The sorting discipline ensures that only bigraphs with
a meaningful structure are constructed. For example, it enforces that a node representing a machine lies within a node
representing its signal.
The controls and sorts used to represent the network are listed in Table 2. An explanation is as follows. Sort p is assigned
to controls indicating MAC addresses, such as control 01:23:45:67:89:ab. We use a special control MAC, to indicate a generic
MAC address, controls Hostname and IP, to indicate a generic hostname and IP address, respectively. The formation rule
is given in Table 3. Informally, it states that most of the entities are atomic (e.g. machines, input, output, etc.) and each
machine is placed inside a signal and is connected to it. Analogously, the router lies within its signal and is linked to
it. Machines are also connected to a property box that contains various conﬁguration details. Note that whereas in the
introductory material in Section 2 we had two controls for machines, i.e. M1 and M2 in Fig. 4, here we have only one
control for machines, M. Individual machines are distinguished by a link to their MAC address. Machines that are part of the
WLAN share a link with the w-node inside the router. Finally, property boxes (and the Internet) are linked to each other via
a pair of communication channels. These are represented by an i-node linked to an o-node.
The initial conﬁguration of a WLAN is given by bigraph S0 in Fig. 7. It models the scenario in which only the router
and the external world are present. The interface is S0 :  → 〈ŝj,∅〉,  indicates no sorted site, i.e. the interface of S0 is a
constant. The algebraic form is S0
def= /x /y (S(x).R(x).W(y).1) | Internet.1
Now we turn our attention to the reaction rules that represent the network events, which include moving in and out of
the router’s range, and the granting and revoking of DHCP leases. We discuss each event in turn, using the graphical form.
A summary of all the reaction rules is given in algebraic form in Table 4, and the interfaces are in Table 5, respectively.
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Formation rule for WLAN.
all̂mwiop-nodes are atomic
all children of an s-node have sort r̂m
an r-node has a w-child
all p-nodes are children of a b-node
all îo-nodes are children of a b̂j-node
all s-nodes are always linked to an r̂m-child
a b-node is always linked to an m-node
a w-node may only be linked to m-nodes
an i-node may only be linked to an o-node
an o-node may only be linked to an i-node
Fig. 7. Initial conﬁguration S0.
Table 4
Reaction rules for network events.
Reaction rule Algebraic form
R1 R ′1
R1
def= /x (share R(x).W(y).1 ‖ id
by φ
in S(x).(id | id) ‖ id1,y,x)
R ′1
def= /x /z /p (share R(x).W(y).1 ‖ /y M(y, z, p).1 ‖ id
by φ′
in (S(x).(id | id) | S(z) | Properties(p).MAC.1)
‖ id1,y,x,z,p)
φ
def= [{1,2}, {0}] φ′ def= [{1,2,3}, {1,2}, {0}]
R2 R ′2
R2
def= /x /p (share /y M(y, x, p).1 ‖ id
by φ
in (S(x).(id | id) | Properties(p).MAC.1) ‖ id1,x,p)
R ′2
def= 1 ‖ 1 ‖ 0
R3a R ′3a
R3a
def= /p (M(y, x, p).1 ‖ W(y).1 ‖ Properties(p))
R ′3a
def= /p (M(y, x, p).1 ‖ W(y).1 ‖ Properties′(p))
R3b R ′3b
R3b
def= /p (/y M(y, x, p).1 ‖ W(y).1 ‖ P ‖ Internet)
R ′3b
def= /p /h /l (M(y, x, p).1 ‖ W(y).1 ‖ P ′ ‖ I)
P
def= Properties(p).MAC.1
P ′ def= Properties(p).
(MAC.1 | Hostname.1 | IP.1 | I(h).1 | O(l).1)
I
def= Internet.(id | I(l).1 | O(h).1)
R3c R ′3c
R3c
def= Properties(x).(id | MAC.1) ‖ Properties′(y)
R ′3c
def= /l /h (Properties(x).C ‖ Properties(y).C ′)
C
def= id | MAC.1 | I(l).1 | O(h).1
C ′ def= id | I(h).1 | O(l).1
R4a R ′4a
R4a
def= /l /h (Properties(y).C ‖ (I(h).1 | O(l).1))
R ′4a
def= Properties(y).(id | MAC.1) ‖ 1
R4b R ′4b
R4b
def= /p (M(y, x, p).1 ‖ W(y).1 ‖ P )
R ′4b
def= /p (/y M(y, x, p).1 ‖ W(y).1 ‖ Properties(p).MAC.1)
P
def= Properties(p).(MAC.1 | Hostname.1 | IP.1)
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Rule interfaces for network events.
Interfaces
R1 : m̂r → 〈ŝbr, {y}〉
R ′1 : m̂r → 〈ŝbr, {y}〉
R2 : m̂r → 〈ŝbm,∅〉
R ′2 : m̂r → 〈ŝbm,∅〉
R3a : p̂io → 〈mwb, {x, y}〉
R3b : îo → 〈mwbj, {x, y}〉
R3c : p̂iop̂io → 〈bb, {x, y}〉
R4a : p̂io → 〈bîo, {x, y}〉
R4b, R ′4b :  → 〈mwb, {x, y}〉
Fig. 8. Reaction rule R1 R ′1: a new machine appears in the router’s signal range.
Fig. 9. Reaction rule R2 R ′2: a machine is no longer in the router’s signal range.
3.2. Moving into the signal range of the router
The ﬁrst reaction rule, given in Fig. 8, models the appearance of a new machine in the signal range of the router. On the
left-hand side, in the expression denoted by R1, the router is in the range of its signal and possibly other signals. This is
expressed by the region surrounding the r-node. On the right-hand side, in the expression denoted by R ′1 (n.b. in general,
the text accompanying a rule describes the right-hand side), a new machine is in the range of the router’s signal. The router
senses the new machine’s signal and possibly other signals. This is expressed by nodes R and M being in the intersection
of the two s-nodes and the region surrounding R. A property box (i.e. a b-node) is also linked to M. Note that the only
conﬁguration setting speciﬁed at this stage is the MAC address of the new machine M. This is witnessed by the p-node
placed inside Properties.
Observe that this reaction rule forces all m-nodes to be shared by only two s-nodes. This means our model does not
capture any interference between the signals of the machines in the system: our model is based solely on information
provided by the router. In other words, we only model what the router senses.
3.3. Moving out of the signal range of the router
Another reaction rule, given in Fig. 9, models the evolution of the system when a machine is no longer in the router’s
signal range. This happens because either a machine switches off its network interface or it moves into a location not
reachable by the router’s signal. On the left-hand side, in expression R2, an m-node is linked to a b-node and placed within
an s-node. These correspond to a machine, its conﬁguration properties and its signal range, respectively. The extra region
enclosing M and the site are necessary to allow the machine modelled in R2 to be in the range of the router and possibly
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Fig. 11. Reaction rule R3b R ′3b . A new machine joins the WLAN: Hostname and IP address are set and communication channels with the Internet are
established.
other machines. On the right-hand side, in expression R ′2, all the nodes have disappeared and only the bigraphical interface
is preserved (see Table 5). This models the absence of the machine from the system. Note that on the left-hand side, there
could be another entity in the site (e.g. the router), which would persist even after we remove the signal S.
3.4. Granting leases
The next three reaction rules describe how the system changes when a machine joins the WLAN and a DHCP lease is
granted. This requires distinguishing between the new machine and those already in the network. We do so by tagging the
latter. The ﬁrst rule, R3a R ′3a , implements the tagging, the second rule, R3b R ′3b , establishes the network aspects of
the untagged machine (i.e. IP address etc.), and the third rule, R3c R ′3c , establishes the communication channels between
the new machine and the tagged machines and then it revokes the tags.
Reaction R3a R ′3a , in Fig. 10, is used to tag all the machines in the system that are already part of the WLAN. On the
left-hand side we have an m-node linked to the w-node. The actual tagging is implemented in the right-hand side, where a
node of control Properties′ takes the place of the corresponding node of control Properties in R3a .
Reaction rule R3b R ′3b models the DHCP server granting a lease to the machine, as depicted in Fig. 11. On the left-
hand side, a machine is not part of the network and the only conﬁguration property already speciﬁed is the MAC address.
This is shown by the absence of a link between the m-node and the w-node and the absence of a site inside the node of
control Properties. On the right-hand side, R ′3b , the machine joins the WLAN, IP address and hostname are set, and two
communication channels with the external world are established. Note that the channels are directional.
In reaction rule R3c R ′3c a pair of communication channels is established between the new machine and the machines
already part of the WLAN, see Fig. 12. On the left-hand side, R3c , a node of control Properties and a node of control Prop-
erties′ specify the conﬁgurations of the new machine and a machine already in the WLAN, respectively. On the right-hand
side, R ′3c , a pair of communication channels is established and a node of control Properties replaces the corresponding node
of control Properties′ in R3c .
We note that initially, all machines that have already joined the WLAN are tagged, using reaction R3a R ′3a . This
means the reaction is applied n times, where n is the number of machines in the network. The resulting interleaving of
applications is conﬂuent, therefore, only one sequence need be considered. Reaction R3b R ′3b is applied once. Finally,
reaction R3c R ′3c is applied n times. Again, due to conﬂuence, only one sequence need be considered.
3.5. Revoking leases
Now consider a machine leaves the WLAN and the lease is revoked, which is represented by two rules. Note, this does
not automatically imply that the machine is also leaving the router’s signal range.
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present in the WLAN.
Fig. 13. Reaction rule R4a R ′4a . A machine leaves the WLAN: Pairs of communication channels are removed.
Fig. 14. Reaction rule R4b R ′4b . A machine leaves the WLAN: DHCP leases are revoked.
Reaction rule R4a R ′4a is given in Fig. 13. R4a speciﬁes a property box for the machine and a pair of channels. The
site also allows the reaction to be applied when other nodes are inside the node of control Properties. On the right-hand
side the interface is preserved and only the two communication channels are removed.
Reaction rule R4b R ′4b revokes the machine’s DHCP lease. This is encoded by the removal of nodes of control Hostname
and IP and the breaking of the link between M and W, as depicted in Fig. 14.
Note that reaction R4a R ′4a is applied ﬁrst, until no other channels can be removed. Again, the order in which the
channels are removed is not important and only one sequence of reactions need be considered. Second, reaction rule
R4b R ′4b is applied once.
4. Predicates
Predicates for bigraphs can be expressed in the logic BiLog [6]. However, if we restrict to an intensional fragment of
BiLog, which omits the Boolean operators and product and composition adjuncts, then any predicate can be encoded (syn-
tactically) as a bigraph (see [4] for formal details), which can be then be checked by reduction to bigraph matching. We
have found this restriction to be suitable for the predicates we require in this application. For example predicates typically
express spatial, static properties of the systems such as “TCP traﬃc is blocked for machine with IP address 192.168.0.3”,
“Machine 01:23:45:67:89:ab is in the range of the router’s signal”, and “Laptop has Internet connection”. The latter property
is represented by the bigraph in Fig. 15.
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Fig. 16. Bigraphs BϕMAC (left) and BψMAC (right).
Deﬁnition. Let α be a predicate and Bα its bigraph encoding. Let S be a bigraph. We deﬁne S |
 α iff Bα is a match in S .
S |
 α denotes Bα is not a match in S .
We often require to reason about whether or not a machine is in the system or part of the WLAN, especially in the
context of enforcing or revoking a policy. We therefore deﬁne the following two predicates (parameterised by a machine
address):
• ϕMAC is true iff the machine MAC is present in the system,
• ψMAC is true iff the machine MAC is part of the WLAN.
The corresponding algebraic forms are:
BϕMAC
def= Properties(p).(id | MAC.1)
BψMAC
def= /p (M(y, x, p).1 ‖ W(y).1 ‖ Properties(p).(id | MAC.1))
These predicates are encoded by bigraphs BϕMAC and BψMAC , depicted in Fig. 16.
5. Generating models of network events in real-time
The model of the current conﬁguration is generated and stored in the Bigraph analysis component. Note, we generate and
store the algebraic form, whereas we use the graphical form for feedback.
The reaction rules and predicates deﬁned in the previous section are used to generate sequences of models, e.g. S0, S1,
. . . , from network events. For a given model Sn in a sequence, we generate a successor model Sn+1 when Sn ∗Sn+1.
Strictly, any model S such that Sn ∗S is a successor model, however, often we store only the model obtained after
several rewriting steps, for example when tagging and untagging is required. This means that the sequence of stored models
corresponds exactly to the sequence of events. Generation is carried out in real-time, without interruption or delay to the
network management system.
An example illustrates the generation process.
Assume the Stream database generates a (derived) network event specifying that machine A is present in the system and
a DHCP lease has been granted. Let the current model be denoted by Sn , and assume the generated event has been sent
to the Bigraph encoder component. The sequence of reaction rules to be applied to Sn is determined by whether or not
machine A is already present in the system and if it has joined the WLAN. Therefore, the Bigraph analysis component is
queried to check if Sn |
 ϕA and Sn |
 ψA . The results are sent back to the Bigraph encoder component. We then have three
cases of model generation, summarised as follows:
• If Sn |
 ϕA and Sn |
 ψA , then the system remains unchanged and no reaction rule is applied.
• If Sn |
 ϕA but Sn |
 ψA , then machine A has to join the WLAN. The generated sequence of reactions is: R3a R ′3a ,
R3b R ′3b , R3c R ′3c , which is sent to the Bigraph analysis component to update the model: Sn ∗3a 3b 
∗
3c Sn+1.
For brevity, we denote this sequence of applications as Sn ∗Sn+1.3
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Encodings for network events.
Event Encoding Notation
Move in range 1 –
Grant lease ∗3a 3b ∗3c ∗3
Revoke lease ∗4a 4b ∗4
Move out range 2 –
Table 7
New controls and sorts for modelling policies.
Control Meaning Sort Graphical notation
Port, . . . Port number p Bold rounded box
WWW, . . . External host p Bold rounded box
P, . . . Protocol p Bold rounded box
BLOCKED All traﬃc forbidden p Bold rounded box
• If Sn |
 ϕA , then machine A has to appear in the range of the router and then to join the WLAN. The generated sequence
is: R1 R ′1, R3a R ′3a , R3b R ′3b , R3c R ′3c , which is sent to the Bigraph analysis component to update the model:
Sn 1 
∗
3Sn+1.
Encodings for the four network events, e.g. move in and out of range, grant and revoke leases, are summarised in Table 6.
6. Bigraphical models of policies
Now we turn our attention to the representation of access control policies by reaction rules. Access control policies
constrain behaviours, for example they can constrain traﬃc between machines, or types of traﬃc. New entities are therefore
required. For example, new controls are needed to express the ban of a given port or protocol. The additional controls are
listed in Table 7, which we call constraints. The formation rule given in Table 3 is also modiﬁed by allowing îo-nodes to be
linked to p-nodes.
Policies are categorised as forbid policies or allow policies. The latter are relatively simple to represent because matching
can detect the existence of a constraint that is required to be removed. However, the representation of forbid policies is a
little more complex.
The key idea of representing a forbid policy is to link chains of p-nodes to communication channels. A chain of constraints
represents a conjunction of constraints, and several chains linked to a channel represent a disjunction of constraints. Some
policies can be represented by a single reaction rule, whereas others require several when a form of tagging is needed in
the representation (because we consider arbitrary network topologies). We illustrate the possible forms of representation
with three example forbid policies. A summary of the reaction rules (algebraic form) for these policies is given in Table 8.
Policy 1: Consider a policy that forbids the machine named Laptop from receiving incoming traﬃc from remote host
WWW, deﬁned by the reaction rule in Fig. 17. This can match only Laptop’s properties box, its out-going channel to the ex-
ternal world and Internet box. In the right-hand side, constraint WWW is attached to the channel’s link. Note that constraints
like WWW are always placed within the sender’s b̂j-box. The inverse reaction P ′1 P1 models the policy being dropped.
While this policy (P1) is represented by a single reaction rule, we note that it must be applied carefully, to avoid multiple
or inconsistent applications. The following example illustrates the problem. Consider a bigraph S in which machine Laptop
is already forbidden from receiving traﬃc from WWW, i.e. a WWW-node is already linked to the channel from Laptop to
Internet (this is indicated by the open link on name c in P1). The reaction rule P1 P ′1 could be applied to this bigraph,
and as a result of the rule application, we would obtain a bigraph in which two copies of the same constraint are linked
to the channel. To avoid this, we must check, before any rule applications for the policy, whether traﬃc from WWW to
Laptop is forbidden. Speciﬁcally, the Bigraph analysis component is queried to check whether S |
 ϕP ′1 , where predicate ϕP ′1
corresponds to the bigraph P ′1. The reaction rule for the policy is applied only if the predicate is false (i.e. P ′1 is not a match
in S). Since the predicate holds for S , reaction rule P1 P ′1 would not be applied in this case.
Policy 2: A more complex model arises when TCP connections with any host using destination ports 8080 or 6881 and
source port 6882 are forbidden. First, rule P2a P ′2a is applied once to all the channels in the system. This results in a
bigraph in which all îo-nodes are tagged, which is necessary in order to ensure that rule P2b P ′2b is applied only once.
Second, rule P2b P ′2b is applied to all the tagged channels; this is depicted in Fig. 18. The left-hand side P2b matches
any tagged channel. On the right-hand side P ′2b , the constraints are placed by linking them to the channels and îo-nodes
are untagged. Constraints on source ports are placed inside the box containing node O (i.e. sender’s Properties box), while
constraints on destination ports are inside the box containing node I (i.e. receiver’s Properties box). The order in which
channels are tagged and untagged is irrelevant. Thus, only one interleaving need be considered.
As in the previous example, the Bigraph analysis component is queried prior to the application of the reaction rules
modelling this policy in order to avoid double entries and inconsistent constraints.
M. Calder et al. / Science of Computer Programming 80 (2014) 288–310 301Table 8
Reaction rules for example policies.
Reaction rule Algebraic form
P1 P ′1
P1
def= Properties(y).
(id | Laptop.1 | I(c).1) ‖ Internet.(id | O(c).1)
P ′1
def= Properties(y).(id | Laptop.1 | I(c).1)
‖ Internet.(id | /h WWW(c,h).1 | O(c).1)
P2a P ′2a
P2a
def= O(c).1 ‖ I(c).1
P ′2a
def= O′(c).1 ‖ I′(c).1
P2b P ′2b
P2b
def= Properties(y).(id | O′(c).1) ‖ Properties(x).(id | I′(c).1)
P ′2b
def= Properties(y).(id | Cs | O′(c).1)
‖ Properties(x).(id | Cd1 | Cd2 | I′(c).1)
Cs
def= /q (6882(c,q).1 | /r TCP(q, r).1)
Cd1
def= /q1 (8080(c,q1).1 | /r TCP(q1, r).1)
Cd2
def= /q2 (6881(c,q2).1 | /r TCP(q2, r).1)
P3 P ′3
P3
def= Properties(y).(id | 192.168.0.9().1 | O(c).1)
‖ Properties(x).(id | 192.168.0.84().1 | I(c).1)
P ′3
def= Properties(y).
(id | 192.168.0.9().1 | /e BLOCKED(c, e).1 | O(c).1)
‖ Properties(x).(id | 192.168.0.84().1 | I(c).1)
Fig. 17. Reaction rule P1 P ′1. All incoming traﬃc from WWW to Laptop is blocked.
Fig. 18. Policy reaction rule P2b P ′2b . TCP connections with any host using destination ports 8080 or 6881 and source port 6882 are blocked.
Policy 3: Finally, consider a policy that forbids traﬃc from host 192.168.0.9 to host 192.168.0.84, deﬁned as a reaction
rule in Fig. 19. The left-hand side matches the channel blocked by the policy. On the right-hand side, special constraint
BLOCKED is linked to the channel.
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Table 9
Encodings for forbid policy events.
Event Encoding Notation
Enforce policy P
tag
∗
enforce
∗
untag
∗ ∗P
Drop policy P
remove
∗ ∗
P
Check policy P
S
tag
∗ T
BϕP match T 
⇒ S |
 ϕP
BϕP match T 
⇒ S |
 ϕP
T
untag
∗ S
–
7. Generating models of policy events in real-time
Reaction rules describing policies are used by the Bigraph analysis component to generate sequences of models encoding
the policy events generated by the Stream database at runtime. The possible policy events are enforce, drop or check policy
compliance. Forbid policy events are more diﬃcult to encode than allow policy events, and so we consider these ﬁrst.
7.1. Encoding forbid policy events
A forbid policy is represented by linking constraints (p-nodes) to channels. Again, we employ tagging to indicate when
rules may or may not be applicable. In the case of enforce, we employ tagging to ensure that constraints are only added
once. In the case of checking policy compliance, the use of tagging is more subtle. The problem we need to overcome is
how to check for the non-existence of a pattern in a bigraph, namely, we require to check that we cannot (bigraph) match
the left-hand side of a policy enforcement rule. So, we tag channels that comply with the policy. If all the channels are
tagged, then a (bigraph) match is not possible, denoted bymatch, and we can conclude the entire model complies with the
policy. Thus, for a policy P, we denote by ϕP the predicate for compliance with policy P and BϕP the corresponding bigraph.
An explanation of the sequence of reaction rules that encode a forbid policy is given below, the rules are summarised in
Table 9, assuming a current model S . The rules are grouped according to three functions: tag, enforce/remove/check, and
untag. We note that tagging and untagging is required when enforcing or checking a (forbid) policy because we are dealing
with an arbitrary topology (with an unknown number of communication channels). Without tagging we would be unable
to determine how many channels to check. Moreover, we can’t just match patterns of the form /c (O(c).1 ‖ I(c).1) to search
for channels without constraints because if such match does not exist, it does not assure us that the policy holds. It may
not hold because the channel is linked to other constraints.
When a forbid policy is to be enforced, generate and apply the following sequences of rules, in order, to the current
model:
1. (tag) a sequence of rules that tag channels in the model that comply with the policy (i.e. tag the channels that are
linked to the appropriate constraint),
2. (enforce) a sequence of rules that link the constraint speciﬁed by the policy to the untagged channels, and then tag
these channels so they are not considered again,
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Encodings for allow policy events.
Event Encoding Notation
Enforce policy P
enforce
∗ ∗P
Check policy P BϕP match S 
⇒ S |
 ϕP
BϕP match S 
⇒ S |
 ϕP –
3. (untag) a sequence of rules that removes the tags applied in steps 1 and 2.
When a forbid policy is dropped, generate and apply one sequence of rules:
1. (remove) a sequence of rules that removes the policy constraints from channels.
When a forbid policy is checked, generate and apply the following sequences of rules, in order, to the current model:
1. (tag) a sequence of rules that tag channels in the model that comply with the policy (i.e. tag the channels that are
linked to the appropriate constraint),
2. (check) whether the predicate ϕP holds for the tagged model (from step 1), by attempting to match BϕP . If a match is
possible, i.e. there is an untagged channel, then conclude S |
 ϕP , otherwise conclude S |
 ϕP ,
3. (untag) a sequence of rules that removes the tags applied in step 1.
7.2. Encoding allow policy events
Allow policies are much easier to encode because constraints are removed, instead of being added to the model. Thus,
we can take advantage of the fact that bigraph matching tests for the existence of a pattern. An overview of allow policy
enforce/check is the following, which is also summarised in Table 10. Again, assume current model S .
When an allow policy is to be enforced, simply generate and apply a sequence of rules that enforce the policy by
removing the relevant constraints. There is no need for tagging.
When an allow policy is checked, simply attempt to match BϕP . Again, if a match is possible, then conclude S |
 ϕP ,
otherwise conclude S |
 ϕP .
We note that is not possible to drop an allow policy. If the user wishes to block some behaviour, it has to be speciﬁed
explicitly as a forbid policy.
7.3. Interplay between network and policy events
When a network event occurs, the Bigraph analysis component applies a sequence of reaction rules as described in
Section 5. However, this may lead to a system in which some policies are not enforced. For example, assume a current
model, Sn , of a WLAN where every machine is forbidden to receive data from remote host WWW. Further, assume a new
machine joins the WLAN. As a result, the Bigraph analysis component updates Sn to Sn+1 thus: Sn 1 
∗
3Sn+1. But in
model Sn+1, the new machine is not forbidden from receiving data from WWW, thus the policy has to be re-enforced.
Let us call a policy that has been enforced, but not dropped, an active policy. In general, in the bigraph model, active
policies need to be checked/enforced/dropped (by the Bigraph analysis component) before and/or after network and pol-
icy events. The exact sequence depends on the event. Informally, consider each possible event and the requirements to
check/enforce/drop active policies:
1. grant a lease – enforce active policies after granting a lease, then check all active polices,
2. revoke a lease – drop active policies before revoking a lease, enforce all active polices afterwards, then check all active
policies,
3. move into signal range – check active policies after moving into signal range,
4. move out of signal range – check active policies after moving out of signal range,
5. enforce a policy – enforce new policy, and add new policy to active set, then check all active policies,
6. drop a policy – drop the policy and remove from active set, then check all active policies.
We can make this more precise as follows, referring to network and policy events by the abbreviations above. For
policy φ, set of active policies Φ , and sequence of network and policy events S, we deﬁne the expansion of a sequence of
events according to the function [| _ |] as follows:
1. [| grant; S |] Φ = grant; enforce Φ; check Φ; ([| S |] Φ),
2. [| revoke; S |] Φ = drop Φ; revoke; enforce Φ; check Φ; ([| S |] Φ),
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4. [| out; S |] Φ = out; check Φ; ([| S |] Φ),
5. [| enforce φ; S |] Φ = enforce φ; check {φ} ∪ Φ; ([| S |] ({φ} ∪ Φ)),
6. [| drop φ; S |] Φ = drop φ; check Φ \ {φ}; ([| S |] (Φ \ {φ})).
We illustrate the process, in detail, in the next section.
8. Example of interplay between network events and policy events in real-time
We show step-by-step how updates are made to the current bigraphical model of the WLAN, according to the events
from the Stream database. We indicate sequences of WLAN models by S0, S1, . . . . Due to conﬂuence properties, we consider
only one possible sequence of updates.
Initially, no stations are present, as given by bigraph S0 in Fig. 7. Now consider the following scenario, a summary of
which is given in Table 11.
1. The user speciﬁes and enforces a new policy that all out-going TCP traﬃc for any machine is forbidden. This user-action gen-
erates a policy event, which triggers the generation of the reaction rules for a forbid policy. We denote the policy by P4
and give the reaction rules in Fig. 20. A brief explanation of the rules is the following. Reaction rule PP4a P ′P4a tags any
out-going channel of any machine that is part of the WLAN2 and complies with P4. Reaction rule PP4b P ′P4b matches
any untagged channel and thus it enforces the policy. On the right-hand side, P ′P4b , a TCP-node is linked to the matched
channel and the channel is tagged (to avoid further treatment). Untagging reaction rule PP4c P ′P4c removes the tags.
Bigraph BϕP4 matches any untagged out-going channel and as described in Section 7, P4 is violated when BϕP4 is a match
in the temporary state in which all blocked out-going channels are tagged. At this point, the Bigraph analysis component
enforces P4 on S0 and we have S0 ∗P4S0, i.e. no reaction rule is applicable because no machines are present in S0. Policy
P4 is also checked. Since BϕP4 is not a match, P4 holds.
2. Machine MAC1 enters a location covered by the router’s signal. Since S0 |
 ϕMAC1 , the Bigraph encoder component instanti-
ates3 reaction rule R1 R ′1 and the Bigraph analysis component updates the system: S0 1S1. After this step, the Bigraph
encoder component checks whether P4 is violated. In this case, reaction rule PP4a P ′P4a is not applicable and BϕP4 is not
a match in S1. Therefore, the policy is not violated.
3. A DHCP lease is granted to machine MAC1. In the current state we have S1 |
 ϕMAC1 and S1 |
 ψMAC1 . Therefore, the
Bigraph analysis component updates the system by applying instantiated rules R3a R ′3a , R3b R ′3b , and R3c R ′3c :
S1 ∗3a 3b 
∗
3c S2. After the topology update, the Bigraph analysis component enforces P4 in S2. The following updates
are performed: S2 ∗P4a 
∗
P4b 
∗
P4c S3.
4 We indicate this sequence of rules by ∗P4 . States S1, S2 and S3 are shown
in Fig. 21.
4. MAC2 enters a location covered by the router’s signal. Since S3 |
 ϕMAC2 , the Bigraph analysis component performs the
same sequence described in step 2 above when machine MAC1 entered the signal range. Speciﬁcally, ﬁrst, the topology is
updated with S3 1S4. Second, P4 is enforced by the usual tagging, matching, untagging sequence: S4 
∗
P4S4. Observe
that no update is performed because reaction rule PP4b P ′P4b is not applicable (there are no out-going channels requiring
to be blocked in machine MAC2). Finally ϕP4 is checked. Since BϕP4 is not a match in T4, P4 is not violated. The bigraph for
updated model S4 is given in Fig. 22.
5. A DHCP lease is granted to machine MAC2. The status of the conﬁguration is S4 |
 ϕMAC2 and S4 |
 ψMAC2 . Hence, the
Bigraph analysis component updates the model by applying the sequence of reaction rules encoding a join event: S4 ∗3S
′
4.
Then, the policy is enforced with S ′4 ∗P4S5. Finally, the Bigraph analysis component checks whether ϕP4 holds. Since BϕP4
does not occur in T5, we have S5 |
 ϕP4 . The bigraph for S5 is given in Fig. 23.
The sequence of events and the corresponding model updates described are summarised in Table 11.
9. Bigraph model analysis
At any point in the model generation process we can check whether the bigraphical representation of the current system
satisﬁes compliance with a policy, or an invariant, or indeed any property that can be deﬁned in the fragment of BiLog. For
example, we check invariants after every update of the system, logging any violations and reporting them, as required, to
the system and/or user. We can also detect conﬂicting policies, as follows. We assume the right-hand side of reaction rules
for policies as invariants. A new policy conﬂicts with an existing one whenever its application invalidates an invariant. As
a simple example, consider reaction rule P1 P ′1 and its inverse P ′1 P1 introduced in Section 6. Assume that Laptop
is the only machine in the system and no constraints are in place. Call the bigraph representing this State Sn . When the
system is updated by P1 P ′1, right-hand side P ′1 is adopted as an invariant. The evolution of the system is given by
Sn 1Sn+1. Now consider an application of the inverse rule, so the system evolves: Sn+1 1′ Sn+2 = Sn . At this point the
2 A channel is present thus a DHCP lease has already been granted.
3 Special control MAC is replaced by actual address MAC1.
4 In this case ∗ is  because only one machine is part of the network in S2.
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drop sequence is ∗P4d . BϕP4 is the bigraph for predicate ϕP4 .
invariant is checked. Since P ′1 is not a match in Sn+2 (node of control WWW cannot be matched), then Sn+2 |
 P ′1, thus
indicating a conﬂict between the two policies. This is a simple example: a policy and its inverse are trivially in conﬂict and
in this case the policies are implemented by single rules. In general, checking for conﬂicts will be more complicated because
a policy is implemented by a sequence of reactions (e.g. because of tagging/untagging). In any event, the runtime system
can either indicate this to the user, deny the enforcement of the second policy, or just keep track of conﬂicts in a logﬁle.
It is possible to reason about the evolution of the system with temporal properties such as “Eventually machine
01:23:45:67:89:ab will be connected to Laptop”, “TCP traﬃc is always blocked for machine with IP address 192.168.0.3”,
“A lease is granted to machine 01:23:45:67:89:ab until it is not in the range of the router’s signal”. These properties can
be expressed in an appropriate (e.g. linear or branching time) temporal logic and then checked in a transition system of all
possible evolutions, generated from the current state. See Fig. 24 for an illustration. In order to generate a ﬁnite structure,
a ﬁxed set of machines and policies would have to be speciﬁed. Further, to reﬂect likely user behaviours, allowable events
have to be speciﬁed (otherwise, from any state we could return to S0). For example, we might wish to reason about future
behaviour, based on the assumption that no machines leave the network, or no new policies are enforced.
Given a ﬁnite transition system, checking a temporal property involves bigraph matching for state formulae and standard
model checking techniques for the temporal operators. The latter is computationally expensive and may not be tractable in
real-time, depending on the number of machines and policies and on the temporal formula. So far, we have not found a
need for temporal properties: state formulae are currently suﬃcient for all veriﬁcation needs expressed by the Homework
system users.
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Fig. 22. State S4: MAC2 enters the router’s signal range, MAC1 is part of the WLAN and P4 is enforced.
Fig. 23. State S5: MAC1 and MAC2 joined the WLAN and P4 is enforced.
10. Implementation
A prototype system is fully implemented on the Homework router, which is hosted on a variety of small form-factor PCs.
The bigraph generation is implemented in OCaml; the matching engine is based on the MiniSat solver [7] and is written
in C++. The Bigraph encoder and Bigraph analysis components are part of the more extensive BigraphER (Bigraph Evaluator
and Rewriting) system [8]. The software runs on a standard Linux Ubuntu distribution. Access control is enforced via NOX
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Generation of models S0  · · · S5.
Event Updates WLAN model Policy
1. P4 enforced
S0 ∗P4 S0
S0 ∗P4aT0
BϕP4 match T0
T0 ∗P4c S0
⎤
⎦ check P4 S0 S0 |
 ϕP4
2. MAC1 in signal range
S0 |
 ϕMAC1
S0 1 S1 ∗P4 S1
S1 ∗P4aT1
BϕP4 match T1
T1 ∗P4c S1
⎤
⎦ check P4 S1 S1 |
 ϕP4
3. MAC1 lease granted
S1 |
 ϕMAC1 and S1 |
 ψMAC1
S1 ∗3 S2 ∗P4 S3
S3 ∗P4aT3
BϕP4 match T3
T3 ∗P4c S3
⎤
⎦ check P4 S3 S3 |
 ϕP4
4. MAC2 in signal range
S3 |
 ϕMAC2
S3 1 ∗P4 S4
S4 ∗P4aT4
BϕP4 match T4
T4 ∗P4c S4
⎤
⎦ check P4 S4 S4 |
 ϕP4
5. MAC2 lease granted
S4 |
 ϕMAC2 and S4 |
 ψMAC2
S4 ∗3 ∗P4 S5
S5 ∗P4aT5
BϕP4 match T5
T5 ∗P4c S5
⎤
⎦ check P4 S5 S5 |
 ϕP4
Fig. 24. Generating all possible evolutions from current state Sn .
(which implements the custom DHCP server) and Open vSwitch, as dictated by the Ponder2 policy engine [9], based on
events recorded in the Homework database.
We trialled the system with both synthetic and experimental data using a router hosted on an Asus Eee PC laptop
with the following speciﬁcation: 1.2 GHz Intel Atom CPU, 2 GB RAM, 200 GB SATA HDD, 802.11b/g, 1 Gbit ethernet, and a
USB-to-ethernet adaptor.
For the synthetic data, we added 30 stations to the initial conﬁguration, ﬁring reaction rule R1 R ′1 30 times starting
from bigraph S0. The ﬁnal state, a network with 30 stations, is a bigraph with 123 nodes. The time to update the (network)
bigraphs increases with the number of nodes, as indicated in the graph of update times averaged over 100 runs, as shown
in Fig. 25. Note that the slowest update requires just under 0.10 s.
Experimental data was taken from actual network trials. For example, the router sensed the signals of 6 stations, then
4 new devices joined the WLAN and were connected to the Internet. The ﬁnal state was a bigraph with 71 nodes. The
update times were similar to those shown above. Evidence from network trials suggests there are rarely more than 20
signals present in a home network and the rate of topology change is much slower than the times used in our (synthetic)
experiment. Moreover, our times include a system overhead to generate and store on disk a graphical representation of each
bigraph (involving an external invocation of the graph layout generator dot). While we expect that considerable speed-ups
and optimisations are possible to the veriﬁcation system, we conclude that the prototypical system can update and analyse
the bigraphical representations of actual home networks in real-time. We note that the current implementation contains
some optimisations. For example, when a DHCP lease is revoked we drop active policies only for the machine concerned (cf.
Section 7.3). This means that we can skip the enforce step and so the sequence of events, for machine M, is: drop Φ on M;
revoke; check Φ .
308 M. Calder et al. / Science of Computer Programming 80 (2014) 288–310Fig. 25. Average time to perform an update as a function of the number of machines in the network (x axis). Each update was performed 100 times and
the average time is reported on the y axis.
11. Discussion
In this section we give an overview of modelling and design decisions we have made and the implications for our overall
approach.
11.1. Why model with BRS?
Our models are one of the ﬁrst applications of BRS to a real world problem and modelling the management of wireless
networks with BRS has some advantages over other process calculi. Arguably the most important advantage is the ability to
express spatial aspects of computation in a natural, hierarchical way, a feature lacking in formalisms such as the π -calculus
and CCS where the underlying spatial structure is assumed to be ﬂat. Cardelli and Gordon’s calculus of mobile ambients [10]
is closer to BRS and allows the location hierarchy to be organised into a tree structure. Additionally, this structure can be
represented graphically by using boxes to encode locations and the nesting of boxes to encode their topology. However,
computation is encoded solely by changes in the spatial structure. In BRS, computation can also be encoded by changes
in the link graph structure. While these process calculi are fundamentally equivalent, bigraphs allow for an easier repre-
sentation of complex systems by keeping the concepts of space and computation separated. In contrast, as a consequence
of the structural operational semantics of process calculi, non-trivial protocols are required when encoding complex state
modiﬁcations.
Nevertheless we did encounter one drawback with BRS modelling, which arises from the declarative nature of reaction
rules (and suffered by all process calculi). Recall, we employed tagging in our reaction rules to overcome problems in three
scenarios:
1. the requirement to apply a rule n times, because we have arbitrary topologies,
2. the requirement to ensure that we do not duplicate the application of a rule,
3. the requirement to encode universal quantiﬁcation (e.g. there does not exist a non-match for a given predicate).
Essentially, these problems are a consequence of the declarative nature of rewrite rules and rewriting: in these scenarios we
require a notion of control. We could, for example, deﬁne that control explicitly, with a reaction rule for each value of n.
But this is rather clumsy and would obscure the clarity of the model; it also assumes we can deﬁne a static upper bound.
A better solution would be to introduce parameterised reaction rules into BRS, as syntactic sugar, thus avoiding the need
for tagging. This is future work.
11.2. Do we have the right abstraction?
We currently model exactly what the router senses and the subsequent events stored in the Stream database. But we
could add additional features such as the physical location of devices, or ownership of machines, if they can constrain
behaviour. Moreover we could also add aspects of real-time, such as the rate of events or timed policies (e.g. a policy
applies between 18:00 and 24:00 every day, or on a given day), if these become relevant. More generally, we aim to model
the events recognised and stored by the Homework network management system; if the system monitors more detailed
behaviour, then the abstraction and the subsequent formal models must reﬂect that.
11.3. Do we have the abstraction right?
In other words, are our models faithful to the actual system, do they abstract from the same semantics? This is a problem
for any modelling approach. In the case of network events, it is fairly straightforward to see our abstraction is faithful. In the
case of the policies, there are often subtleties about how exactly to interpret a policy, which may depend on user intentions.
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how user comprehension and implementation can be diﬃcult. Throughout the project we have discussed policy design and
implementation with the developers of the policy engine, using the bigraph graphical notation. This has provided informal
validation that bigraph models can help policy language designers agree on interpretations and resolve ambiguity.
11.4. Can we use the sequence of models in other ways?
The approach we have described here is a form of runtime veriﬁcation, in that we construct a directed simulation and
test for behaviours satisfying or violating certain properties. Our approach is not based on data traces or deadlock detection,
rather it is a form of runtime formal modelling. While this has signiﬁcant overheads, compared to more conventional
runtime veriﬁcation, we propose that the additional requirements of behaviour that is both spatial as well as temporal, can
justify this. The result is much richer feedback that informs the user’s cognitive model. For example, traditional veriﬁcation
might report that a packet was observed on a channel, or a variable has a particular value, whereas we can report a much
more detailed model (of the state of the system) that explains current spatial relationships and communication links. We
could make further use of the sequence of generated models, for example for debugging and for supporting understanding
the causes of failure (e.g. we could rollback and replay), or for generating tests from the results of the failed veriﬁcations.
11.5. Can we improve feedback?
As we have stated earlier, our long-term motivation is to aid users in their understanding of the state of their system,
and to give feedback to developers about user experiences. We have not yet carried out a formal evaluation of this, but
informal evaluations from the (Homework) system developers is that the bigraphical feedback from the runtime veriﬁcation
is helpful to them. However, while bigraphs permit a straightforward and intuitive graphical representation, we conjecture
that our system representations, which are based on Venn diagrams, may be too unfamiliar and/or detailed for non-expert
users. We plan to experiment with other graphical representations that can be generated automatically from our bigraphs.
For example, can we generate the cartoon in Fig. 2 from the bigraph in Fig. 3; can we generate the cartoons used in the
Homework system drag and drop interface for policies? Are there constraints on the style of cartoons that can be generated
from our bigraphs? Furthermore, we may not wish to reveal all the detail initially, but, for example, only present properties
when the user rolls a mouse over the (representation of) a machine. This will be future work.
12. Related work
There is a signiﬁcant body of work on analysis of policies and conﬂicts in the context of network management, for
example [11], but we are unaware of any approach involving real-time analysis of process calculi models.
Runtime models for managing the complexity of evolving software behaviour while it is executing is a recent area of
interest, particularly in the domain of self-adaptation (e.g. recent Dagstuhl seminar [12]). While our domain is different, our
work has a similar goal in that it is reasoning about context-dependencies at runtime. We note a related online, event-driven
formal modelling approach taken in [13] to checking conﬁgurations of a home-care application. In this case, the conﬁgu-
ration data was streamed from log ﬁles of user activity; empirical use of the reasoning system also revealed state-based
reasoning was suﬃcient and there was no need for temporal operators.
13. Conclusions
We have extended the Homework network management system with runtime veriﬁcation comprising real-time genera-
tion and analysis of bigraphical models of network topology, network events and access policies. This work represents one
of the ﬁrst applications of bigraphical modelling to a real world problem, and a novel use of process algebraic modelling in
a runtime veriﬁcation context.
Both standard network events, such as a machine entering a signal range or having a DHCP lease revoked, and forbid and
allow access policy enforcement or dropping, are represented by bigraph reaction rules. We have presented the full details
of the representation so as to expose the precise details of how policies work and their interplay with network events.
Many rules involve the concept of “tagging” entities, to limit the scope of applicability of the rules. While this adds some
complexity to the representation, it is an inevitable consequence of reasoning about complex computation with declarative
rules.
The real-time generation of bigraph models is event-driven: we apply the reaction rules of a bigraphical reactive system,
according to events captured in the Homework stream database. In essence, we generate a real-time simulation trace, where
states are bigraph representations of the live system: at each step, the bigraph state is checked for invariants and violations
are reported to the user.
Veriﬁcation is done via a bespoke software component, based on reasoning about predicates by bigraph matching, en-
coded in a SAT solver. The veriﬁcation system is fully implemented on the router and our experiments indicate that model
generation and analysis can be carried out in real-time. We have outlined how to model-check temporal properties, but so
far there is little evidence from user trials that temporal operators are required.
310 M. Calder et al. / Science of Computer Programming 80 (2014) 288–310Future work will be in three areas: feedback, eﬃciency, and quantitative behaviour. The ﬁrst includes developing and
evaluating different forms and type of feedback about the outcomes of the veriﬁcation process to both the user and the
system. For example, we will extend the system so that the Bigraph analysis component communicates directly with the
Stream database component. Whenever an invariant is not satisﬁed, the violation is recorded in a table in the database;
users and diagnostic applications can subscribe to the table and obtain real-time updates of the system status. We will
also explore (graphical) abstractions of bigraphical representations that may be more accessible and/or meaningful to users,
and conduct user trials with them. We will consider extending the matching engine in the Bigraph encoder component to
support regular expressions on controls. This can greatly reduce the number of matching instances, especially when reaction
rules involve ranges of addresses. Finally, we will extend the modelling to stochastic bigraphs [14], to represent the rate of
traﬃc and bandwidth capabilities, thus extending the range of policies we can consider.
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